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I think that when somebody writes the history of our time 50 or 100 years from now, it
is unlikely to be about the great recession of 2008. It is also unlikely to be about the
fiscal problems that America confronted in the second decade of the 21st century.
It will be about how the world adjusted to the movement of the theatre of history
towards China. Lawrence H. Summers (2010)

E

conomists, public policy mandarins and decision-makers in the business community
the world over have been awestruck by the People’s Republic of China’s (hereafter
China) vertiginous GDP growth, relentless economic ascent, sustained capital
accumulation, large changes in sectoral composition of output, escalating regional and
global heft and integration with the regional and global economies. With the prompt and
timely support of countercyclical macroeconomic policy measures, China weathered the
global financial maelstrom of 2007–9 resiliently, which indisputably accentuated its
importance in the regional and global economies. Although China’s GDP growth
decelerated during the crisis period, the economy never suffered a recession. Chinese
demand helped to pull a number of economies into recovery. It led the global recovery and
contributed to the recovery efforts of the Asian emerging-market economies (EMEs).
Without China’s support the so-called Great Recession would have been more severe,
deeper and lasted longer (Das, 2011a).
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If an EME is defined as an economy that is advancing towards becoming an advanced
industrial economy, as testified by its rapid GDP growth and pace of industrialization,
China is an epitome of EME. An EME tends to have lower per capita income and business
and industrial activities than an advanced industrial economy but much higher GDP growth
rate. The heft of an EME in the global economy is usually on the ascendance. The Chinese
economy has been demonstrating all these idiosyncratic characteristics of an EME for some
time. As the largest EME, the largest creditor country, the fastest growing economy and the
oldest continuous civilization and still run by a one-party communist bureaucracy, China
occupies a unique position. After almost two centuries of conflict and humiliation by
foreign powers, China is on its way to returning to the center of the global economy, a
position it held between 1300 and 1820 (Maddison, 2006).
During what became known as the Great Recession and recovery China, in collaboration
with some of the other Asian EMEs, continued to drive global growth and global
productivity growth (Das, 2011a). During the global recession of 2009, the Chinese
economy displayed an astounding ability to grow at 9.2 percent. In 2009, China’s share of
global growth was almost the same (90 percent) as all the advanced industrial economies
put together. In 2010, the year of global recovery, China accounted for about a third of
global growth (Makin, 2011). After growing at the rate of 10.3 percent in 2010, the Chinese
economy was showing no signs of slowing down or descending to a lower growth trajectory
in 2011. The International Monetary Fund (2011) has projected its 2011 GDP growth rate at
9.6 percent and 2012 growth rate at 9.5 percent.1 At this juncture, China’s economic boom
has entered into its fourth decade. While the crisis and recession (2007–9) left deleterious
effects over other economies, particularly over the advanced industrial economies, they
managed to enhance China’s relative regional and global economic and financial
prominence. The post-crisis Chinese economy is widely regarded as the principal engine of
regional and global growth.
The objective of this article is first to provide an exposition of the fact that instituting
market-oriented macroeconomic reforms, liberalizing the economy and institutional upgrading turned China, a centrally planned command economy, productively and profitably
towards a market mechanism and a free-enterprise economy. These strategic measures
created turned China into an EME in a record time span of a generation. This article
highlights China’s stupendous economic achievements in areas of growth and
industrialization. The end result of these measures drew approbation of academics, policy
mandarins and business leaders in the rest of the world. Initially this transformation was
slow but it has accelerated since the early 1990s, albeit state control of the economy and
intervention in it were not abandoned.
Reforms and restructuring measures had a deterministic effect on China’s rate and pattern
of growth. In thirty-two years, China rose from a marginal and systemically insignificant
1

The source of statistical data used here is IMF (2011).
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economy to the second largest in the world; this was a veritable economic miracle. In a
succinct manner, this article traces the myriad stages, events and structural transformations
along China’s growth path. While adopting the free-market doctrine, the government
emphasized prudent fiscal policy, privatization, maintaining a balanced budget and aimed
for low inflation. Switching from a centrally planned, command economy framework to a
market mechanism was not only a momentous policy change but also “was the single most
important cause of the on-going expansion in productivity” (Bernanke, 2006). Turning to
the free-market system also explains China’s export success “much more than the principle
of comparative advantage” (Rodrik, 2006).

Economic Growth and Transition
In the early 1980s, China was an agrarian, impoverished, inward-looking, low-income and a
near autarkic economy. At the time of launching its market-oriented macroeconomic
reforms in 1978 its per capita income was $182 and trade-to-GDP ratio 9.7 percent. At this
juncture, China’s exports amounted to $9.8 billion, or 0.6 percent of the multilateral
exports. China’s total trade in 1978 was $21 billion. Quantitative planning of trade was
done by a handful of foreign trade corporations and it had no relation to China’s
comparative advantage. These statistics attest that China was an absolutely marginal
economy and that it began its rise to global prominence from a very low base. Summers
(2007) pointed out that in a span of three decades China has experienced the same degree of
industrialization that took two centuries to occur in Europe.

Superlative Growth Performance
Few parallels are available to China’s rapid GDP growth performance in economic history.
China established itself as an economy with the highest long-term average GDP growth rate
in real terms in the fastest growing region of the global economy. It achieved this
distinction without suffering from any major crisis or sharp interruption in the growth
process, which were common in the other EMEs. Beyond any shadow of doubt it is an
exceedingly dynamic economy, which has successfully integrated both regionally and
globally.
A prominent recent development in the arena of international economy was China storming
up the league tables to overtake Japan in the second quarter of 2010. It reached the second
slot in the table of the world’s largest economies. Japan was the second largest global
economy for over four decades. This was a symbolic moment for China, because in terms
of dynamism and economic influence China had outpaced Japan a long time ago. The
annual 2010 GDP figures were as follows: Japan’s GDP was $5.5 trillion while China’s
$5.9 trillion. It was well neigh impossible to visualize in 1978 that China would achieve this
enviable distinction in a short time span of three decades. This was the time when the CPC
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adopted its renowned Deng doctrine, the Gai Ge Kai Fang, or “change the system, open the
door” strategy, which in turn incited the Chinese economy’s celebrated U-turn.
Various time points have been computed for China to become the largest global economy.
According to The Economist (2010b) China will eclipse the US and be the number one
economy in 2019. According to an Australian government white paper, “by some measures,
China has the potential to overtake the US as the world’s largest economy around 2020”.2
In an upgraded forecast, Goldman Sachs’ chief economist Jim O’Neill reported that China
will overtake the US economy by 2027 (The Economist, 2010a). However, the renowned
economic historian Angus Maddison projected 2030 as the time point for China reaching
the top (Maddison, 2001). Public perception regarding who is leading at present is
interesting. According to the Gallup’s World Affairs survey of February 2011, 52 percent of
the Americans responded that China is the leading global economy, while 32 percent
perceived the US as the largest (Gallup, 2011).
During the periods of global slowdown China was an important source of growth. It holds
true for 2001-033 and 2009 and also during the recovery of 2010 (section 1). China
succeeded in sustaining a near 10 percent real GDP growth rate for three decades. Rapid
growth also sharply reduced the proportion of the population living in absolutely poverty. A
recent World Bank (2009) report testified that between 1981 and 2004, the fraction of
China’s population consuming $1 a day in today’s purchasing power fell from 65 percent to
10 percent; as a consequence half a billion people were lifted out of poverty. This
magnitude of decline in poverty in such a short time span has no historical precedent. In
rural China, the poverty rate plummeted from 18.5 percent in 1981 to 2.8 percent in 2004
(Chaudhury and Ravallion, 2007). It has either achieved most of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) or is close to doing so. Compared to the late 1970s,
improvement in the quality of life and economic development has been nothing short of
phenomenal.

Structural Transformation
During the three-decade-long comprehensive reform period China’s economy underwent a
profound transformation. Traditionally the structure of an economy is divided into primary
(agriculture and extractive activities), secondary (industry and manufacturing) and tertiary
(services) sectors. The earlier theorists on economic growth regarded structural
transformation an essential condition for attaining high rate of per capita income growth or
growth of output per worker (Lewis, 1954; Kuznets, 1979). Structural transformation
essentially implies that the factors of production are reallocated from less productive sectors
or industries to more productive ones. It was regarded as a source of growth by the eminent
2

Quoted in The Australian, May 2, 2009.

3

Prasad and Rumbaugh (2004) show that during 2001-03 China accounted for 24 percent of global
growth measured in purchasing power parity terms.
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scholars of the post-World War Two period. The concept of structural change and factor
reallocation was the basis of Chenery et al.’s (1986) theory of economic development. They
regarded factor reallocation as vitally important in explaining economic growth and
performance. Lucas (1993) and Verspagen (1993) also constructed models of industrial
development in developing economies. The former took supply-side variables, while the
latter took demand-side variables. Both laid a great deal of emphasis on the importance of
structural change in growth as well as in total factor productivity (TFP) growth. From this
perspective the Chinese economy is a fortuitous research case. Sectoral reallocation of
resources as well as their reallocation across manufacturing firms has been a key source of
productivity growth for the Chinese economy. The rate of return on investment has
remained well above 20 percent (Song et al., 2011).
As stated in section 2.3 below, China’s total GDP and industrial output increased several
times over the three-decade-long comprehensive reform period. The manufacturing sector
expanded even at a faster pace than the GDP. The manufacturing sector recorded robust
growth and maintained its dominance of the Chinese economy throughout the reform period
(Table 1 and Graph 1). In 2008, it was the largest sector, accounting for 48.1 percent of
GDP. Except for the early 1990s, manufacturing accounted for around 50 percent of the
GDP. The only exception to this was the 1994–2000 period, when the industrial sector
produced more than 50 percent of the total GDP.
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Table 1
Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices
Year

Gross
Domestic

Primary /
Agriculture

Secondary /
Industry

Product
(100 million
yuan)

(%)

(%)

Tertiary /
Services
Manufacturing

Construction

(%)

(%)

(%)

Price Base Year=1970
1978

3548.2

26.4

49.8

93.1

6.9

23.8

1979

3816.9

26.0

50.1

93.5

6.5

23.9

1980

4116.2

23.8

52.7

92.8

7.2

23.5

Price Base Year=1980
1980

4567.9

30.0

48.5

91.2

8.8

21.5

1981

4807.4

30.5

46.9

91.1

8.9

22.6

1982

5242.8

31.2

45.4

91.2

8.8

23.4

1983

5811.8

30.5

45.2

90.7

9.3

24.3

1984

6693.8

29.9

44.9

91.0

9.0

25.2

1985

7595.2

26.8

46.9

90.7

9.3

26.2

1986

8267.1

25.5

47.5

90.2

9.8

27.0

1987

9224.7

23.9

48.4

89.9

10.1

27.7

1988

10265.3

22.0

49.8

90.5

9.5

28.1

1989

10682.4

21.8

49.7

91.6

8.4

28.5

1990

11092.5

22.5

49.4

91.7

8.3

28.1

Price Base Year=1990
1990

18547.9

27.3

41.6

88.9

11.1

31.1

1991

20250.4

25.6

43.4

89.3

10.7

31.0

1992

23134.2

23.5

46.0

89.3

10.7

30.5

1993

26364.7

21.6

48.4

89.5

10.5

30.0

1994

29813.4

19.8

50.7

89.9

10.1

29.5

1995

33070.5

18.8

52.0

90.0

10.0

29.2

1996

36380.4

17.9

53.0

90.3

9.7

29.1

1997

39762.7

17.0

53.6

91.0

9.0

29.5

1998

42877.4

16.3

54.1

91.0

9.0

29.6

1999

46144.6

15.6

54.4

91.3

8.7

30.1

2000

50035.2

14.7

54.9

91.6

8.4

30.4
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices
Price Base Year=2000
2000

99214.6

15.1

45.9

87.9

12.1

39.0

2001

107449.7

14.3

46.0

88.1

11.9

39.7

2002

117208.3

13.5

46.3

88.2

11.8

40.2

2003

128958.9

12.6

47.4

88.2

11.8

40.0

2004

141964.5

12.1

47.8

88.6

11.4

40.0

2005

158020.7

11.5

48.2

88.2

11.8

40.4

Price Base Year=2005
2005

184937.4

12.1

47.4

88.2

11.8

40.5

2006

208381.0

11.3

47.7

87.8

12.2

41.0

2007

237892.8

10.3

48.0

87.6

12.4

41.7

2008

260812.9

9.9

48.1

87.7

12.3

42.0

a) There are two figures at the base switching year, one at the former base
year prices, another at the latter.
b) Please refer to the brief introduction for the defination of gross domestic
product at constant prices.

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2010. Beijing. China. China Statistics Press.
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Graph 1

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2010. Beijing. China. China Statistics Press.
Chen et al. (2011) estimated the stochastic frontier sectoral production function and
concluded that TFP growth exceeded the quantitative growth of inputs since 1992. Using a
decomposition technique, they also found that the structural transformation in the Chinese
economy substantially contributed to TFP and output growth but decreasingly over time.
This empirical analysis inferred that the market reforms and changes in industrial structure
significantly accounted for the overall trend and the sectoral heterogeneity of factor
allocative efficiency during the process of rapid industrial growth. The industrial sector in
the Chinese economy will continue to remain dominant in the foreseeable future because of
extensive investment that has been made in the manufacturing capacities. Besides, while the
level of education in the Chinese society has improved in the recent past, it has not
progressed so much as to carve out and support a robust and dynamic services sector of the
kind that the advanced industrial economies have developed. This group of economies is
known for its knowledge-intensive business services.
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One prominent sectoral transformation occurred in the shifting roles of the primary and
tertiary sectors. The primary sector was close to a quarter of the GDP in the late 1970s. It
rose first in importance to approximately one-third in 1984, but after 1991 went into a
steady decline. In 2008, it contributed a paltry 9.9 percent of the total GDP. In contrast, the
tertiary sector demonstrated a gradually bolstering trend. In the late 1970s, it accounted for
only a quarter of the GDP, but in 1990 its contribution climbed to 31.1 percent. Its
contribution to the GDP remained stationary for some time and in 2000 it was 30.4 percent.
Tertiary sector activities expanded sharply after this juncture and in 2008 it accounted for
42 percent of the GDP (Table 1 and Graph 1). These transformations in the structure of the
Chinese economy present a vivid picture of the dynamic growth in an economy that started
from a low base and grew to be the second largest in the world. China’s transformation to a
tertiary sector dominated economy cannot occur in the short-term. However, given the swift
stride of development the tertiary sector, it could unavoidably become a dominant sector in
about a decade.
The present stage of China’s industrialization is far from maturity. It is still in its initial
stages. With the passage of time the economy will absorb more labor from the agricultural
sector. It may go into labor-intensive industrial and other sectors. Parallel to the structural
transformation indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the proportion of industrial valueadded went on increasing from an exceedingly low level of 17.6 percent in 1952 to a high
level of 44.1 percent in 1978. In the pre-1978 period, China’s industrial development was
heavy-industry based. During the post-1978 reform era it changed to a mix of light and
heavy industry. China’s industrial value-added during this period stabilized around 40
percent (Chen et al., 2011). This level has been sustained until the present.
Other major areas of structural transformation were the burgeoning of a de novo private
sector and dismantling of the SOE sector which was a distinguishing trait of the non-market
economy period (section 2.7) and turning a nearly autarkic economy into an outwardoriented economy. In a short time span, China opened up to trade and investment flows in
large measures. During the first decade of the twenty-first century China’s trade-to-GDP
ratio was 70 percent or above, much higher than that of other comparable EMEs. Since it
acceded to the WTO in 2001, trade and FDI made larger contributions to China’s GDP
growth than before (Lawrence, 2008). Given its outward orientation, its rapid expansion
and the fact that it is the second largest economy in the world, China is likely to have a
large impact on the global trading system and pattern as well as its policies. It will be a
force to reckon with in the future evolution of the global trading system. So far China has
promoted multilateral trade liberalization as well as at regional level through free-trade
agreements (FTAs).

Dramatic Change in Global Economic Stature
Long-term GDP growth statistics are available for 119 economies. Of these, the Korea and
Taiwan recorded comparable long-term average GDP growth rates in the post-1960 period,
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although not equal to that of China. Diamond-rich Botswana also fared well. During the
three decades of reform (1978–2008), “China’s total gross domestic product (GDP),
industrial output, foreign trade and importantly, its per capita income increased respectively
by factors of 16, 27, 124, and 12” (Golley and Song, 2010: 1). With the passage of time,
China inaugurated an unambiguous shift in the contours of regional and global economic
power balance. Its heft in the global economy increased at a swift pace. In terms of
purchasing power parity (PPP), China’s share of global GDP increased from 2.0 percent in
1980 to 12.52 percent in 2009. Computed in nominal dollars and market prices, this
increase was from 2.6 percent to 8.3 percent over the same period (Dahlman, 2010).
Japan (in the 1960s) and the four Asian NIEs (in the 1970s) were also high performers
during similar stages of their development and they won accolade from the global academic
and policy-making establishment for their export-and-FDI-led rapid industrialization.
However, due to the sheer size of China’s GDP, its global economic impact is, and will be,
much higher than that of any of the NIEs. In terms of systemic significance, it is far more
important. The Japanese economy had a great deal of systemic significance and global
impact during its high-growth period, but it entered a “deep slump” in the fourth quarter of
1991 (Bernanke, 2000, p. 149). Its real GDP growth rate in 1991Q4 through 1999Q4 was
less than 0.9 percent per year. It is yet to recover from its self-induced paralysis. Japan’s
share in global GDP has been on a decline since 1991.
At the time of launching the reforms in the late 1970s, China’s contribution to the growth of
the world economy was less than 0.1 percent. In 2010, China became the main driver of
global growth. It contributed 33 percent to the global growth (OECD, 2010). This reflected
both the catch-up momentum in China and slower trend growth in the advanced industrial
economies. It has also begun to have wide-ranging ramifications over global economic and
financial architecture as well as in the areas of international business and investment. In
November 2008, in the context of the severe global financial crisis, the first Group-ofTwenty (G-20) summit took place in Washington, DC. China and the US, as the two most
important members of the G-20, were expected to propose initiatives to support the global
economy and stabilize financial markets. For the record, it must be mentioned that
according to the World Development Indicators 2010, China’s GDP in current dollars was
$4.98 trillion in 2009. Its GNI per capita, also in current dollars, was $3,650, making it a
middle-income country. In terms of PPP its per capital income in 2009 was $6,890 (World
Bank, 2010). As shown in Table 2 and Graph 2, growth rates of these two vital indicators
picked up in the twenty-first century.
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Table 2
GNI Per Capita Income in PPP and Market Exchange Rate (in dollars)
Year

PPP (in $)

Market Exchange Rate (in $)

1980

250

220

1981

280

220

1982

320

220

1983

370

220

1984

440

250

1985

500

280

1986

550

310

1987

620

320

1988

700

330

1989

750

320

1990

800

330

1991

890

350

1992

1,020

390

1993

1,180

410

1994

1,340

460

1995

1,480

530

1996

1,650

650

1997

1,820

750

1998

1,960

790

1999

2,120

840

2000

2,340

930

2001

2,560

1000

2002

2,830

1100

2003

3,180

1270

2004

3,590

1500

2005

4,130

1,760

2006

4,790

2,050

2007

5,640

2,490

2008

6,280

3,050

2009

6,890

3,650

Source: The World Bank (2010). World Development Indicator Online Database. Washington DC.
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Graph 2

Source: The World Bank (2010). World Development Indicator Online Database. Washington DC.
From a completely peripheral economy approximately three decades ago, China became the
third largest in the world in 2007, measured in market prices and exchange rates, and the
second largest in 2010. By 2009, it had become the largest exporter, when the value of its
exports was $1,202 billion (or 9.6 percent of the total multilateral exports). China edged out
Germany and the US to be world’s biggest trading power. In 2009 those countries followed
China with 9.0 percent and 8.5 percent shares in total, respectively (WTO, 2010). Since
2005, measured by cargo tonnage Shanghai has been the world’s busiest port. In 2009,
China also became the largest energy consumer. It is also the largest consumer and importer
of iron ore, aluminum, copper, nickel, potash and timber products (Das, 2011b). According
to Standard and Poor’s 2010 ranking, five of the 50 largest banks in the world are Chinese.
Rising prosperity has ushered in dramatic lifestyle changes in China.
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Growing Middle and Affluent Classes
Three decades of rapid clip growth has propelled China into the ranks of lower-middleincome countries with a swiftly emerging middle-class (WB, 2011).4 Not only has the size
of China’s middle class grown significantly, but the McKinsey Global Institute has also
highlighted the rise of an urban middle class whose spending power will soon redefine the
Chinese market. These urban affluent consumers earn more than Rmb 100,000 (or $12,500)
a year and command Rmb 500 billion, which is approximately 10 percent of urban
disposable income (Farrell et al., 2006). This segment of consumers has cultivated a taste
for globally branded luxury goods. They regard them as the de rigueur symbol of social
status. This class of well-off customers is swelling by the year. According to the March
2011, Forbes list of billionaires, China has 115 on the mainland alone.
Income elasticity of demand for luxury goods is usually regarded as very high, much higher
than 1. Therefore, confident Chinese consumers have become a key factor for the global
luxury goods market. China’s big cities now have gleaming new high-end shopping malls
and glitzy boutique. The global financial crisis did not adversely affect the super-rich
segment of the Chinese market. The luxury goods market in China bucked the trend during
2009; while global sales fell by 8 percent across the globe China recorded an estimated
growth of 12 percent (KPMG, 2010).
The global size of the luxury brand goods market is $80 billion; Chinese consumers
shopping at home and abroad accounted for 10 percent of total global sales. According to a
KMPG (2010) study, China was the second largest luxury market in the world after Japan
in 2010. However, by 2014, China is projected to be the largest market for luxury goods
(Chadha and Husband, 2007). It is also the second-largest market for Rolls Royce cars, the
perennial financial status symbol, accounting for 20 percent of total sales in 2010 (Daily
Telegraph, 2011). Largely due to Chinese customers, 2010 recorded a 57 percent sales
increase in luxury brands of Swiss watches, like Cartier, Piaget and Vacheron Constantin.
China is the fastest growing market for the high-priced, classic, ultra-thin dress watches
manufactured in Switzerland. In 2009, China accounted for 5.3 percent of total Swiss
exports, compared with 0.2 percent in 2000, and 2.7 percent in 2005. Omega has 180 stores
in China, including 15 directly-owned ones. Some of the Omega watches, like the
Constellation line, are enormously popular with the prosperous Chinese. Although Omega
is a global company and does not design its products according to markets, in 2009, Omega
redesigned an entire line to appeal to Chinese taste and launched it in Shanghai
(Koresnikov-Jessop, 2010).
For China’s nouveau riche Chateau Lafite has become a drink of choice, which has been
driving its prices into the stratosphere (Stimpfig, 2011). Some of the toniest luxury brands
are scrambling to establish substantial retail outlets in urban shopping districts of Chinese
cities. Louis Vuitton has 36 stores in 29 cities in China, Gucci 39 and Hermes 20
4

According to the World Bank (2011) the per capital income range for the lower-middle-income group of
countries is $996 through $3,945.
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(McKinsey, 2011). The well-known fashion brand Burberry has 53 stores in China. Driven
by its high sales in China, it had an excellent year in 2010; Chinese sales jumped by 30
percent over its 2009 figures (Barrett, 2011). In 2010, a global recovery year, luxury goods
market became revitalized in China. According to a market survey in 17 Chinese cities by
McKinsey (2011), this market was on track to reach Rmb 180 billion ($27 billion) by 2015.
At this point, China will account for over 20 percent of the global luxury goods market,
surpassing Japan as the world’s largest luxury goods market.

Second Largest Importing Economy
As industrialization progressed, China became an insatiable consumer and large importer of
industrial raw materials, intermediate inputs, technology and consumer goods (Das, 2011b).
With $1,006 billion worth of imports in 2009, China is the second largest importer in the
world after the US (WTO, 2010). China is the largest importer of energy and several other
important industrial raw materials and resources. As China’s commodity imports increased,
their world market prices firmed up, which in turn benefited the commodity exporting
economies.
China’s role as a large importer influences both the regional and global economies. Its
rapidly rising imports of parts and components from the neighboring East and Southeast
Asian economies are of enormous significance to them. They supported strong economic
expansion in these economies. These countries have become a part of China’s export
ecosystem. China’s imports from these Asian countries rose much faster than its exports to
them. For many developing economies and EMEs, rapid growth in exports to China became
an important contributor to growth. In particular, for several Asian economies, notably
Korea and Taiwan, Chinese imports were responsible for one-half of their export increase.
China is also credited with helping the long-moribund Japanese economy. Its large imports
also contributed to the firming of oil and commodity prices. China’s status in the domains
of multilateral trade, global financial markets and manufacturing output catapulted it over
its rival economies. China has recorded very high import growth rates for consumer goods
—about 15 percent annually for the last 15 years. This is much higher than the world
average of 10 percent (IMF, 2010).

Manufacturing Behemoth
In the post-1978 period, the manufacturing sector became a significant driver of Chinese
economic growth. China succeeded with its unorthodox strategy in rapid industrialization. It
not only turned from an agrarian to a vigorous and internationally competitive
manufacturing economy but it also integrated well into regional and global manufacturing
products and services markets, carving an imperious niche for itself in the regional and
global production networks. What is atypical and surprising is that China was able to do this
despite the initial lack of financial sector development.
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The Chinese government adopted a wide array of industrial policies in an unorthodox
manner to support what it referred to as a “national team” of large state-owned enterprises.
The ultimate objective of this strategy was to create large firms that could eventually
become globally competitive. This policy was in direct contrast to the prevailing trend of
liberalization and globalization and against the grain of what is known as the Washington
Consensus. Instead of the “invisible hand”, the visible hand played a decisive role in
China’s strategy. These national team enterprise groups and subsidiaries performed well
with respect to a number of performance measures (Sutherland, 2007).
Although China’s manufacturing enterprises are a formidable competitor in the global
markets to those in the other Asian EMEs, it successfully competes with all the three groups
of economies: namely, the advanced industrial economies, the EMEs and developing
economies. McKay and Song (2010: 2) contend that China was able to move to the “center
of the world (economic) affairs through manufacturing-led development”. China became a
gigantic manufacturing economy and is frequently referred to as a “manufacturing
juggernaut” or “world’s factory” in the economic and financial press. It occupies a large
share of global production in several industries like toys, bicycles, microwave ovens, shoes,
textile and apparel, televisions, air conditioner, mobile phones, washing machines,
refrigerators.
About one-third of the value-added of the Chinese manufacturing sector is exported and the
rest is considered substitutable with foreign goods in the domestic economy. In 2010, China
accounted for 15 percent of the world value-added in the manufacturing industries. This
proportion is the same as that for Japan (OECD, 2010). Productivity growth in the
manufacturing sector has been high. Growth accounting analysis by Bosworth and Collins
(2008) led to the conclusion that TFP growth in the manufacturing sector contributed 55
percent of output growth in the manufacturing sector between 1995 and 2005.
Rapid industrialization progressed with greater spatial concentration and increasing regional
specialization of industrial activities. Long and Zhang (2010) show increasing
interconnections among firms in the same industry as well as those in the same region.
Industries have become increasingly spatially connected and regions have become
increasingly specialized. Industrializing firms followed Michael Porter’s industrial cluster
concept (Porter, 2000). The manufacturing sector in China has emerged as strong and
globally competitive. It is difficult to compete with in a large range of manufactured
products. In 2010, the US held the top spot in manufacturing output, however it is poised to
relinquish this distinguished status to China in 2011 (Marsh, 2010). This will end a 110year run of the US as number one nation in factory production.5 According to the Global
5

According to the IHS Global Insight, a Boston-based forecasting company, in 2009 the US was
responsible for 19.9 percent of world manufacturing output, compared with 18.6 percent for China. The
US managed to stay ahead despite a steep fall in factory production due to the global recession. In 2011,
on the basis of IHS’s estimates, China’s factory output will amount to $1,870 billion, a fraction ahead of
the projected US figure for the year (cited in Marsh, 2010).
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Wind Energy Outlook (2010), China overtook the US as the world leader in wind power in
2010. According to the 2010 report, China’s installed wind capacity has grown
exponentially, from 0.3 GW in 2000 to 42.3 GW in 2010; it accounted for 22 percent of the
world’s total wind power capacity (GWEC, 2010).
A significant fraction of exports are products that are designed in other parts of the world,
frequently by firms in the advanced industrial economies. This is called processing trade
(section 2.3). China development of this kind of contract manufacturing capability has been
extraordinary. Contract manufacturing enabled Chinese industrial firms to develop close
relations with those in the advance industrial economies. This means that China’s own
industrial success is tied to that of its business partner firms and countries. The contract
manufacturing activity ranges over a wide array of industrial products, from toys
manufactured by Mattel, or personal computers (PC) by Lenovo to highly sophisticated
components for the Airbus. Although China has emerged as a manufacturing base for firms
around the globe, the sheer size of its industrial sector and its rapid growth has caused
challenges for many business firms and even economies (Feenstra and Wei, 2010).
In several major industrial subsectors, China became the largest producer during the 2000s.
For instance, it overtook the US in steel production about a decade ago and the European
Union in 2003. It surpassed Korea in 2010 to be the world’s largest shipbuilder in terms of
shipbuilding capacity and new orders. Also, in 2010 China ploughed more than $1,000
billion into new buildings projects. This construction boom propelled it to the top of global
construction, surpassing the US for the first time (PwC, 2011). Another notable industry
where China is a confirmed global leader is passenger cars, excluding light commercial
vehicles. China overtook the US in 2006. By 2010, it was producing between a fifth and a
quarter of total global auto production. As domestic household income rises, the
manufacturing sector output is bound to grow larger. However, given the background of
global imbalances, China needs to change it trajectory of industrialization. As noted below,
efforts are afoot to turn its external demand biased industrialization towards domestic
demand. During the first half of the twenty-first century, regional and global economies
may well bear the imprint of China’s manufacturing-led economic development. Their
growth patterns may in turn be shaped by it.

A Burgeoning de novo Private Sector
In the early 1980s, as the reforms progressed, the government began downgrading the role
and significance of the SOEs. A large number of them were incurring losses, some of them
heavy. In 1984, SOEs were asked to devise shape-up strategies, strengthen their
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management capabilities and be commercially viable. Gradually small and medium private
sector enterprises began to be established. They were officially encouraged more after 1990.
The state sector had to abandon food and beverages, textiles and apparels, home appliances
and the other consumer goods industries for the private sector. Former state monopolies in
finance, electricity, telecommunications, railroads, civil aviation and petroleum were also
legally opened for private sector business firms.
Over the preceding three decades, the private sector enterprises had made a large
contribution to rapid GDP growth and employment generation. In the post-1990 period this
sector became more dynamic. Not only have a large number of them established themselves
well but they are also devising new business models, production processes and management
systems. They are also known for training personnel and nurturing talent. Accession to the
WTO stimulated the private sector hugely. Private enterprises also pressured the SOEs to
become more efficient. The long-term trend is that in terms of production and assets the
weight of the private sector enterprises has steadily increased and that of SOEs declined.
The share of private sector enterprises in industrial production was 80 percent in 2008 (WB,
2010).6
In China a lot of talent, determination and perseverance are needed for the private sector
business firms to establish because despite the constitutional amendment of 2002, which
gave them rights equal to those of the public sector, they are still frequently discriminated
against. Several major markets and industrial sectors have still been regarded as off limits
for them. They have limited access to bank credit and the risk-averse banks show little
interest in servicing their credit needs. State-owned banks, which dominate the banking
system, particularly shun smaller firms. Even in 2009, 80 percent of bank credit went to the
SOEs (Zhang, 2011).
The private sector firms increasingly rely on informal financial markets, which are
becoming progressively more mature. They tend to save costs through maintaining lower
inventory and have to rely on retained earnings. Undoubtedly great deal of variations exists
in financial access among private firms; usually smaller private firms face more financial
constraints than the larger ones. Access of large and established private firms to bank
finance is usually equal to their SOE counterparts (Hale and Long, 2011). Private sector
enterprises also do not enjoy many official benefits that SOEs do. They need financial and
policy support. Private sector business firms frequently have to maintain close ties with the
SOEs and survive and prosper on their periphery. The most critical financial difficulty that
private sector enterprises face in China is in the area of long-term funds to make
investments for growth. Future financial reforms need to make this their high priority.
Often credit for China’s successful private manufacturing sector is assigned to its
bureaucracy. According to this line of thinking, it is the heavy role of the so-called visible
hand that made China a successful manufacturing giant. The term “state-directed
capitalism” is frequently used to describe China’s brand of capitalism. Important role
6

See World Bank (2010a), Box 1, p. 3.
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played by the state cannot be denied. It has earnestly endeavored to eliminate both physical
and technological obstacles commonly faced during the early and middle stages of
industrialization. To eliminate the former state built physical infrastructure and to remove
the latter it facilitated transfer of foreign technology. Although this imperative role of the
state should be acknowledged, China’s industrial vigor and dynamism owes much to what
has been happening from the bottom up. Comparable to the celebrated Mittelstand of
Germany, China has a multitude of vigorous private enterprises. The Economist (2011, p.
11) christened it “a fast-growing thicket of bamboo capitalism.” This bamboo capitalism
“lives in a laissez-faire bubble”. Liu and Siu (2010) applied Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimator derived from a structural investment model to a large sample of
Chinese industrial firms. They found robust evidence of listed private companies being
more profitable than similar listed SOEs. The results from their benchmark estimation
indicated that return on capital for a private sector firm was more than 10 percentage point
higher than that of a similar SOE. The highest returns on equity were reported by unlisted
private enterprises.
Notwithstanding the problems and scarcity of credit, the private sector did well during the
Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) period. According to the statistics released by the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the number of private business firms
increased from 4.3 million to 8.4 million during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan years. This
was an average annual rate of growth of 14.3 percent and total growth of 93 percent. At the
end of 2010, private enterprises accounted for 74 percent of all enterprises in China. They
made a significant contribution to employment generation. Employment in the private
sector exceeded 180 million at the end of 2010, 60 million more that at the end of 2005. The
private sector enterprises employed approximately 7.87 million workers laid off by the
SOEs in the last five years (Gang, 2011). Private sector investment also increased at a
remarkable pace. These enterprises moved into new fields such as biological medicine, new
energy, information technology and other strategic areas. Large private enterprises were
also active in strategic acquisition of globally acclaimed foreign brands. Lenono’s
acquisition of IBM’s PC division and Geely Holding Group’s acquisition of Volvo are
cases in point.

Summary and Conclusions
This article defines EMEs in a simple and functional manner and shows that the Chinese
economy not only has those characteristics but also is an epitome of an EME. It is the
largest EME, well on its way to be an advance industrial economy in the fullness of time. A
remarkable, perhaps even astonishing, economic event of the early part of the twenty-first
century is that China has become the second largest economy in the world in a short span of
three decades. Its stature in the global economy continued to increase and it contributed
significantly to the recovery of the global economy from the global financial crisis (2007–
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9). From a long-term perspective China can convincingly be presented as a clear winner of
globalization.
This article follows China’s stellar growth path and the profound economic transformation
it accomplished to become an EME in a remarkably short period of a generation. Its global
stature also underwent a profound transformation. Not only it succeeded in alleviating
poverty but also a substantive middle-class emerged in China, having a large purchasing
power. It has grown into the second largest importing economy in the world, driving
regional and global growth. An important development in this regard is that in the first
decade of the twenty-first century it had become a manufacturing behemoth. Although
state-owned enterprises are still active and have a meaningful place in the Chinese
economy, its private sector has gradually emerged and despite difficulties has grown from
strength to strength.
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